High-Value Virtues

High-value virtues are qualities or characteristics considered morally and ethically positive. They are often valued for contributing to personal growth, positive relationships, well-being, and Deep Work! Different cultures and philosophical traditions may emphasize virtues, but some are widely recognized across various belief systems and ethical frameworks. Here are some of my favourite high-value virtues. #virtues

The quality of being honest and having strong moral principles. Individuals with integrity are trustworthy and act with consistency in their values.

Showing kindness, empathy, and concern for the well-being of others. Compassionate individuals strive to alleviate the suffering of others and understand their perspectives.

The ability to bounce back from setbacks, adversity, and challenges. Resilient individuals maintain a positive attitude and adapt to changing circumstances.

Facing fears and challenges with bravery and determination. Courageous individuals act in the face of difficulty, even when it involves personal risk.

Willingness to share resources, time, and energy with others. Generous individuals contribute to the welfare of others without expecting immediate personal gain.

Acknowledging one's limitations, being open to learning from others, and avoiding arrogance or excessive pride. Humble individuals recognize the value of different perspectives.

Appreciation and expressing thanks for the positive aspects of life, as well as acknowledging the contributions of others.

Remaining calm and composed in the face of delays, challenges, or difficult situations. Patient individuals can tolerate frustration without becoming irritable.

Cultivating these virtues can lead to a more fulfilling and meaningful life, individually and within communities. Different philosophical and religious traditions may prioritize and define virtues in various ways. Still, the common thread is the promotion of positive qualities that contribute to personal and collective well-being.

The Virtue of Aristotle's Ethics

According to Aristotle’s ethical theory, the virtuous person exhibits the joint excellence of reason and of character. The virtuous person not only knows what the good thing to do is, she is also emotionally attached to it. In addition, these two excellences, or virtues, are intimately connected, so that the one cannot be had without the other (Nicomachean Ethics 6.13, 1144b30-2; 10.8, 1178a16-19). Unfortunately, Aristotle isn’t particularly explicit about the details of how these two virtues are mutually dependent, a fact which has sparked a vigorous debate among scholars. Some scholars stress the intellectual virtue pertaining to action, viz. practical wisdom (phronêsis), as the overarching disposition, while others emphasise the constitutive role of the habituated disposition to feel appropriately.1

In the The Virtue of Aristotle’s Ethics, Paula Gottlieb claims for virtues of character, such as courage, temperance, and justice, a place she thinks they have been unduly denied. She argues that the virtues of character have been poorly understood and that “the parts of his [ethical] theory examined here that have been maligned and neglected may be the most interesting and valuable of all” (214). Short of explicitly downplaying the importance of intellectual virtues, she claims that excellence of character is the ethically important virtue for Aristotle.

The book is divided into two parts. In the first part, comprising chapters 1-5, Gottlieb presents her own account of how Aristotle’s virtues of character should be understood. She singles out the doctrine of the mean as the key to that understanding. A virtue of character is an action-guiding disposition to hit the mean between two extreme emotions within a certain field. Courage, for instance, is the disposition to hit the mean between cowardice and rashness in the field of danger. The mean is determined not by the extremes alone, but by these in relation to the demands of the particular situation, including facts about the agent herself. She also defends Aristotle against misgivings about the virtues of character by showing these to be based on uncharitable readings, or on straightforward misinterpretations. She argues against the idea that virtues of character amount to moderation (Kant), and the suggestion that they are remedies for natural deficiencies in human nature (Philippa Foot, Christine Korsgaard). Moreover, it is through the doctrine of the mean that the contribution of the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom is best appreciated, for it takes a reasoned view of the situation to hit the mean. The doctrine of the mean also provides a criterion for distinguishing between real virtues and mere emotions or natural temperament.

In the second part, which comprises chapters 6-10, Gottlieb puts her interpretation of the virtues of character to the test by showing how it clears up a number of contentious issues in Aristotle’s ethical theory. These include the nature of moral dilemmas, virtuous motivation, how to understand the so-called practical syllogism, what the virtuous agent needs to know, and what kind of political arrangement best nurtures the development of virtuous persons. So in less than 250 pages, Gottlieb takes on an array of difficult, and much disputed, issues in the Nicomachen Ethics. It is a bold enterprise she undertakes.

Gottlieb’s relaxed and easily accessible style deserves praise. She intends the study not only for Aristotle scholars, but aims at a broader audience interested in ethical theory, particularly virtue ethics. The purpose is to show that on a sound reading of Aristotle, his account of the virtues of character makes an important contribution to the contemporary ethical debate. Thus, she lays claim both to a new, original interpretation of Aristotle’s account, and to its philosophical relevance. At its best, scholarship manages both things in a single study. Gottlieb’s study, though, is more than once marred by a too perfunctory treatment of contemporary theories. The comparisons would have required a more thorough treatment to be fruitful. Perhaps the scope of difficult issues is too wide to be manageable.

Before I turn to some of Gottlieb’s more contentious and problematic claims, I have some concerns about the general approach of the study. To begin with, the assumption seems to be that something substantial in the understanding of Aristotle’s virtues of character has been lost on the scholarly community, and that once we make up for this negligence, these virtues will appear philosophically more attractive, and some central and longstanding issues in Aristotle’s ethical theory will appear less problematic. Gottlieb’s account of the nameless virtues in chapter 2 perhaps makes up for a neglected aspect, although I will return to a point of disagreement with that account. By and large, however, it is a fairly conventional interpretation she puts forward. The claim that a virtue of character is the disposition for a state of equilibrium between two extreme emotions relative to the particular circumstances isn’t startling.2 Her repudiation of some alternative interpretations in chapters 1 and 3 is compelling, but the targets of the polemics do not represent the main stream of Aristotle scholarship.